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1. Introduction 
 
  While in practically all countries in the world there are disagreements about what 
is the optimal extent of redistribution, income redistribution of one kind or another takes 
place within each nation. The fact that redistribution is limited to national jurisdictions is 
best illustrated by noticing that rights to welfare benefits are generally linked to 
citizenship. In the economics and philosophical literature there are various rationales 
given for redistribution within national borders. The question this paper asks is very 
different—whether  a case can be made for global redistribution, that is for the existence 
of  cross-country transfers that would go from rich citizens of rich countries to poor 
citizens of poor countries.  
 
  Social transfers, in principle, include two types of transfers. The first are 
insurance-based transfers (like pensions and unemployment benefits). The second are 
purely redistributive transfers based on needs, and not on any actuarial calculations.2 We 
are interested in needs-based transfers. There are several possible cases that can be (and 
have been) made for their existence at the national level.  
 
  Individuals belonging to a nation, not only elect their own government, but enter 
into a “social contract” which implies that they, up to some extent, care for each other 
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 Pensions and unemployment benefits are examples of social transfers that are always based on an element 
of  (and sometimes entirely) on actuarial considerations.  
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and are willing to transfer income from those who have it to those who are poorer. 
Rawls’s “justice as fairness” in Theory of Justice (TJ) is explicitly couched in contractual 
terms (Rawls, 1971, p. 16). In real life, for example, the creation of the Swedish 
“People’s Home” program in the late 1930’s, which practically defined what we 
understand today under the term of welfare state, was also contractual. It was made 
possible thanks to a consensus of the two leading parties, then, of trade unions and 
employers, and was facilitated by the ethnic and cultural homogeneity of the population.  
 
  This last point (ethnic and/or cultural homogeneity) is very important when 
discussing cross-border transfers, for it is a crucial point that separates the application of 
certain principles of justice domestically from their application globally. As is well 
known, the difference principle, defined by Rawls in his Theory of Justice,  is used to set 
the limits to the maximum acceptable departure from the state of full economic equality. 
In the background, and not explicitly mentioned in TJ but apparent when one contrast 
that book with the much later The Law of Peoples, is that the difference principle operates 
in an environment of a single people, who, following Mill, are supposed to share 
common “sympathies”, as well as culture and history. This caveat (one people) will 
assume crucial importance when we move to looking at the possible justifications of 
global redistribution, viz. application of the difference principle at the global level.  
 
  More empirically, a simple observation that representative democracies do choose 
to proceed to some redistribution of income implies that this reflects voters’ preferences. 
In expressing these preferences, voters may be led by an implicit insurance perspective, 
voting for taxes that finance needs-based transfers on the assumption that even if they do 
not require transfers now, they might become beneficiaries at some point in the future. 
Or, voters might  be led by some “affinity” that they feel for their fellow-citizens and 
might hold that every member of a community must be assured a minimum income to 
cover at least his/her (socially-defined) subsistence needs. Whatever the motivation, the 
facts are that the needs-based transfers exist in practically all rich nations, and that their 
size in terms of GDI or people’s disposable income is sizeable (see Table 1). 
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Table 1. Domestic needs-based social transfers and official development assistance  
in selected OECD countries  
 
 In percent of country’s GDI   
 (1) (2)   
 Needs-based 
domestic social 
transfers 
(1999)* 
Official 
development 
assistance (2003) 
Ratio  
(1) to (2) 
“Worth” of a domestic 
poor expressed in terms 
of “foreign” poor 
(rounded to the nearest 
000) 
United Kingdom 7.6 0.34 22.4 97,000 
France 2.8 0.41 6.8 30,000 
Germany 3.2 0.28 11.4 36,000 
Italy 2.2 0.16 13.8 62,000 
Sweden 2.5 0.70 3.5 103,000 
Netherlands 3.8 0.81 4.7 76,000 
United States 4.8 0.14 34.6 32,000 
Source: For domestic social transfers, see Heady, Mitrakos and Tsakoglou (1999, Table 1, p.19). For 
Official development assistance data from Shah (2006, Table “Official development assistance (ODA) 
from 2002 to 2005”). Based on OECD website.  
Note:  includes only means-tested transfers.  
*/ Fiscal year 2000 for the United States. Data from Rector (2001).  
 
  But when we extend our gaze from the nation state to the global level, we notice 
an entirely different picture. The needs-based transfers that cross national borders are 
limited to relief assistance and bilateral aid. As Table 1 shows, the cross-border needs-
based transfers are minute compared to within-national transfers, and of course even 
more so if we compare them to some objective and citizenship-blind needs. For it is very 
clear that were transfers needs-based only, namely, regardless of where those who need 
them live, most of the transfers would be cross-border. The extent of the home bias can 
be roughly estimated using just a few numbers. The percentage of the very poor (with 
gross per capita income of less than $PPP 2 per day) is about, or fewer than, 1 percent in 
all OECD countries;3  it is almost 40 percent in the world (2.6 billion people according to 
the latest World Bank numbers).4 We can then calculate the implicit social value placed 
on a poor person living in a rich OECD country compared to an equally poor person  
living in the rest of the world. Take UK for example. On this calculation, about 0.6 
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million British citizens get some 7.6 percent of British GDI while 2.6 billion people in 
the world receive only 0.34 percent of British GDI. In other words, each “domestic” poor 
counts as much as 97,000 foreign poor people. The numbers are not much different for 
other rich countries: each “domestic” poor counts as “little” as 30,000 and as much as  
100,000 “foreign” poor.  This is the wedge that the national political process draws 
between the same needs depending on whether they are felt domestically or globally.5 
 
  We can of course take these data as an accurate and inalterable description of 
reality and argue that cross-border transfers or global redistribution is either unrealistic 
since hardly anyone engages into it, or even undesirable. The latter was to some extent 
the position taken by Rawls in his influential Law of Peoples where cross-border transfers 
are to be limited only to (i) the “burdened” societies (defined as those whose material 
poverty prevents them from creating the institutions of liberal or at least “decent” 
society), and (ii) to be finite in time, the cut-off point being when “burdened” societies 
become either liberal or decent. Furthermore the transfers are not to exceed the 
subsistence minimum needs. In addition, the “outlaw” or authoritarian societies are  
excluded from the list of those who should be helped regardless of poverty of their 
citizens.6 Rawls’ global redistribution is therefore quite minimal even if it could be 
regarded, by the standard of what actually exists currently, as relatively generous. 
 
  One’s views about global redistribution are not solely determined by what 
actually exists or by one’s views about the feasibility or desirability of global institutions, 
the likely future role of the nation-state, or the extent to which our “affinity” might apply 
to the people with whom we do not interact,  but also—and this is infrequently 
recognized in the literature—on one’s economic view of the world. This view is often 
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implicit, or at least not prominently displayed. If one is likely to believe that “the crucial 
element in how a country fares is its political culture—its members’ political and civil 
virtues” (Rawls, 1999, p. 117), a statement strongly influenced by David Landes’ (1998) 
reading of economic history, then one would naturally be less sanguine regarding the 
desirability of transfers and cross-border aid. If one holds (as Beitz, 1999, pp.136ff, and  
Pogge 1994 do) that the distribution of resources is a significant determinant of countries’ 
income levels, and since that distribution is from a  moral point of view arbitrary, one 
would be more inclined toward some global redistribution. If  international economic and 
financial rules are slanted against the poor countries (Pogge 2002; Jomo 2002; Risse 
2005, Bardhan 2002), whether in the area of protection of intellectual property rights or 
selective trade liberalization, then some redress may be in order. Alternatively, those 
who, following the work by Bairoch (1997) and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 
(2001), view institutions and European colonialism in particular to have shaped current 
inter-country income distribution, may argue that the currently rich societies should 
compensate the currently poor societies. The arguments pro or contra some form of cross-
border aid thus heavily depend on what economists think are key determinants of growth, 
and which one among the theories (since economists are unlikely to come up with only 
one) we find more plausible than others.   
 
  Before we discuss the arguments for a global redistribution, it is important to 
focus on one, perhaps main, channel whereby  the existing global inequalities between 
individuals in the world, as well as between counties, could be reduced. That channel is 
free migration of labor. As we know from elementary economics, allowing free migration 
of labor would probably entail a  massive movement of labor from poor to rich countries 
and would, by improving the allocation of global labor, lead to an increase in global 
output. A very rough estimate of the static gains associated with a partially free migration 
is put at more than $150 billion annually which is equal  to the sum of all official 
development assistance and estimate of welfare gains from all proposed trade 
liberalizations (see Walmsley and Winters, 2002). This amount thus dwarfs the existing 
cross-country transfers flows, and would probably dwarf any conceivable transfers that 
may be envisaged even within a more globally redistributive perspective. 
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2. Migration 
 
  The issue of migration, and of gains from it, is particularly interesting because 
migration of labor should be one of the key aspects of globalization. Almost by definition 
globalization includes free mobility of all factors of  production. There is no a priori basis 
why it should exclude one factor of production.  Moreover, the past globalization 
(roughly from 1870 to 1914) was indeed characterized by massive free migration flows 
(to be distinguished from flows of coerced labor)  mostly from Europe to  the Americas, 7 
or from India and China to other parts of Asia or the Americas.8 As Harris (2004, p.1)  
puts it, “if anyone had suggested in, say, 1910 that migration was an unusual 
phenomenon, they would have been regarded by a knowledgeable person with 
astonishment”. Yet, currently migration is much smaller in absolute numbers, and of 
course even more so if compared to total world population. Additionally, we are 
witnessing increasing obstacles to migration raised by the rich countries. In Rawls’s 
work, such restrictions are fully justified. Each people is regarded as being in essence  a 
custodian of its own culture, traditions, and the piece of land it currently occupies. As 
such, each people has the right to accept or exclude members of other peoples from 
moving in.9 
 
  In economic terms, it is difficult not to see how greater migration may not be 
conducive to higher world output. A simple example may suffice. Consider two 
countries, R (for rich) and P (for poor). The first will have a much higher capital stock 
per worker than the second. Consequently, its output per worker will also be higher for 
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“the commercial state” is singled out for especial opprobrium. One of course cannot but wonder where 
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most  of the conceivable (or probably all) population ranges. Suppose further—to 
simplify the matters but also to stack the cards against gains from migration—that 
population size in both countries is optimal, that is, it is such that output par worker is 
maximized given the existing capital stock in each country (see Figure 1). This means 
that the initial positions will be such as A and B. If movement of labor from poor to rich 
country occurs under these conditions, (i) total output will go up because the marginal 
product of a worker who emigrates from P to R will be higher in the new setting, and (ii) 
the average per capita outputs in both countries must fall (this is of course true by 
construction since we have assumed that the populations are such that income per capita 
is at its feasible maximum). Neither the citizens of the poor nor rich country (except for 
those who would migrate) would therefore have an incentive to vote for free migration of 
labor. However, world as a whole would be manifestly better off. When there is such an 
outcome, we know from welfare economics that, to make such a move possible, winners 
may have to compensate the losers for their income loss (while there would be still a net 
gain for the winners—migrants in this case—since total output is higher). But it also 
shows that free migration of labor might have to be accompanied by some (at first sight) 
unexpected compensation principles. Migrants might have to be taxed in order to provide 
the “bribe”  for people in rich countries to allow them in, and for people in poor countries 
to let them leave. 10 
 
  Finally, notice that if the populations in the two countries are at the optimum, and 
there are legal impediments to migration (from whichever side: receiving or emitting 
country), no migration at all would take place and potential output gains  will not be 
realized. Each country will be in “equilibrium” even if marginal products and output per 
capita differ.11  There are also other, perhaps more realistic assumptions. Assume, for 
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example, that the population size of  a poor country is higher than optimal—given its 
capital stock—and the population size of the rich country is less than optimal.  Under 
these conditions, transfer of labor from P to R would entail not only an increase in world 
output but also an increase in per capita incomes in both countries. There would be no 
need for compensation of losers by winners: all three types of people (original  citizens of 
rich and poor countries as well as the migrants) would be better off. 
 
Figure 1. Optimal capital-to-labor ratio in two countries without mobility of labor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  We have considered here the simplest case of  (implicitly) one type of labor: 
people in the South and North are fully interchangeable. But the situation becomes more 
complex when we have two or more types of labor (say, unskilled, medium-skilled and 
highly skilled workers) and one fully or partially mobile factor of production like capital. 
As Piketty (1997) shows, with two types of labor and abundance of unskilled labor in the 
South, free migration unambiguously leads not only to higher overall output for the 
world, but for higher income for the poor in the South (the unskilled laborers). The poor 
                                                                                                                                                 
(member) and once they reach the optimum (as in Figure 1) there is simply no interest from the better-off 
firm to hire away some labor from the worse-off  firm. When we apply this analysis to two countries, 
however, transfer of labor would occur since individual entrepreneurs are not interested in maximizing 
country’s income per capita (but their own). So formal impediments to migration must exist to produce 
equilibrium despite different marginal products.  
MPLr 
MPLp 
Capital-labor ratio 
Output per worker 
A 
B 
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are thus, in a Rawlsian twist, shown to benefit from open borders. This improvement is 
no longer assured when we deal with three kinds of labor and assume that positive 
complementarities between different types of labor are greater the closer to each other are 
workers’ skills. The efficient outcome could be such that the medium-skilled workers 
from the South end up migrating North to work with the highly skilled Northerners 
(complementarity between them being positive). This then the deprives the remaining 
unskilled workers in the South of people with whom they worked before; they would now 
have to work among themselves and their output (and income) would be less than it was 
before. As Piketty (1997) shows, such an outcome is not likely in  practice because it 
requires an extremely high negative elasticity of complementarity between the highly 
qualified Northerners and the unskilled Southerners, but in principle, we cannot exclude 
it. Were this the case, then free flow of labor and an increasing world output would be 
compatible with the worsening position of the poorest people. Yet again—some  
compensation rules would be needed even in the presence of fully open borders. 
     
3. Compensation 
 
Returning to the issue of possible arguments for global redistribution, global 
transfers can be justified on three grounds: transfers as compensation for past wrongs, 
transfers based on the cosmopolitan interpretation of the difference principle, and Rawls’ 
own more limited principle of redistribution which aims to enable “burdened” societies to 
accede to the status of “decent” or “well-ordered”. The first approach projects the past 
onto today’s decisions to redistribute; the second is concerned only with today’s 
distribution of income among world citizens; the third is concerned with satisfying 
minimal economic requirements for the functioning of a reasonably democratic society. 
Thus the objectives of the three principles will be quite different. 12 
 
Consider the grounds for compensation. The logic is that there is responsibility of 
a (part of) the currently rich  world for the current poverty of the poor countries. The 
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 This list is not exhaustive. At least two other grounds for transfers can be adduced: compensation for 
uneven distribution of natural resources, and compensation for the functioning of the international 
economic system if its rules are slanted against the poor countries (or peoples). 
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cause lies in colonialism and more generally introduction of exploitative institutions. 
These institutions have not only spoiled the colonized countries of their own wealth 
(including by the provision of cheap or servile domestic labor) but have also been 
responsible for blocking progress of the poor countries since their own  elites have found 
it easy and convenient to maintain the exploitative institutions introduced by the 
Europeans. The two points, (i) introduction of exploitative institutions by the colonizers 
(of course, in countries where it was the best strategy) and (ii) their persistence as an 
obstacle to growth, are the claims made in a very influential paper by Acemoglu, Johnson 
and Robinson (2001). 13 Although the main objective of their paper was to explain why 
there is a persistence of large per capita income gaps between countries in the world, 
there is obviously no reason why, if one adheres to the Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 
logic, the same argument may not be used for compensation requests. 
 
If we treat these two points separately, and use as a ground for compensation only 
the first one—exploitation—since it is much less ambiguous and more easily 
documentable, one could still come up with fairly substantial numbers. Consider for 
example two conservative estimates of the “colonial drain”—unrequited transfers from 
colonies—from Dutch Indonesia and British India (see Maddison, 2001). The 
comparisons are interesting because they cover exactly the same period and were made 
by Maddison (2001, p. 87) using the same methodology. For the period 1868-72, 
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Colonial International in which colonized peoples would have primacy (rather than workers from the 
advanced countries). So Sultan Galiev wanted to fight exploitation by having erstwhile exploited 
expropriate and then exploit in their turn the former masters! Frantz Fanon (1974, p.51), in his Les Damnés 
de la Terre writes: “When we hear that a head of a European country, with the hand on his heart, declares 
that he for sure must help the poor and undeveloped peoples, we are not at all touched by such a gesture. 
On the contrary, we say to him: ‘This is a reparation that is owed to us’” (my translation). 
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Maddison estimates Dutch drain to have been 7.4 percent of Indonesia’s net domestic 
product, and British drain to have been 1 percent of Indian NDP. For the period 1911-15, 
the drain amounted to respectively 7.6 and 1.3 percent, and finally between 1926 and 
1930, it was estimated at 10.3 percent and 0.9 percent.  If we take only the estimates for 
these fifteen years (and assume that the drain during all other years was zero),14 and use 
Maddison’s own estimates of contemporary Indian and Indonesian GDI per  capita and 
population sizes, and a very modest discount rate of 1 percent  per annum, we obtain that 
the present value of the colonial drain (expressed in 1990 international dollars) was 7.7 
trillion in the case of Indonesia and 4.8 trillion in the case of India. The former amount is 
22 times Dutch current GDI, the latter amount is four times UK’s current GDI.15 Were 
we to include other years under colonialism (more than one hundred in each case), the 
amounts would become exorbitant.   
 
Much higher estimates for India are made by Patnaik (2005, Table 6). The three-
year average of unrequited transfers out of the subcontinent onto Britain are estimated at 
6.05, 6.01 and 5.27 percent of British GDI in respectively 1801, 1811 and 1821. Taking 
only this last year since it is the only one for which we have GDI per capita and 
population data in Maddison (2004) and using the same low discount rate of 1 percent per 
annum, the current value of the compensation works out to be more than half-a-trillion in 
1990 PPP dollars.  This is almost one-half of Britain’s annual GDI in the early 2000’s.  
 
Moving to the second point, viz., introduction of growth-inhibiting institutions, 
colonialism is regarded by Bairoch to have been the main cause of non-transmission of 
technological revolution to the South, to the colonized countries (see Bairoch, 1997, vol. 
2; Bairoch, 1989). While Bairoch does not think that colonial exploitation helped much 
the rich world (in other words, he holds that the extent of trade between North and South 
was negligible for the North, and that Northern technological revolution had internal 
causes and was not driven by colonialism), he holds that colonization held back 
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 Maddison data for India and Indonesia start in 1870. For the two earlier years (1868 and 1869), we 
assume all the factors to have been the same as in 1870.  
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 “Current” means year 2000 GDI expressed in 1990 international dollars (all data from Maddison, 2004). 
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development of the poor world. 16A similar view is propounded by Kuznets (1973, p. 
254):  “…the increasing national cost of organization in developed countries made for 
policies toward other parts of the world that, while introducing some modern economic 
and  social elements were, in many areas clearly inhibiting”. At the extreme, Bairoch’s 
and Kuznets’s argument can be interpreted to mean that even if direct exploitation was 
zero, compensation would be in order because of the second element: namely, 
introduction of policies and institutions that were inimical to growth. 17 
 
 One can argue for compensation—whether because of exploitation or impediment 
to growth, or both—using Rawls’ own assumption that at the global level relations 
between individuals are mediated by the “peoples” or states where they live. Since in 
international relations, it is “peoples” that have meaning, it may then make sense that 
“people” of England today compensate “people” of India today for the transfers that 
occurred between their forefathers. Yet, arguing for global transfers based on the 
compensation  principle has two, in my view, potentially fatal flaws. First, even assuming 
that the colonizers are responsible for things mentioned above, the ambit of exactly which 
colonizing nations are responsible is unclear. Surely, conquest and rapine have existed 
since time immemorial. But perhaps because overseas colonization is more recent and 
might have palpable effects on the current distribution of wealth in the world, we can take 
an arbitrary date and consider only cases of colonization after that date. Let us say that 
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 In other words, it is not the resource transfer from the South to the North that was the chief culprit for 
Southern failure to develop but that their mutual relations were structured in such a way (advantageous to 
the North) which inhibited Southern industrial development. The key points are summarized by Bairoch 
(1997, vol. 2, 665-669, 647-8) under the term of “colonial contract” between the metropoles and colonies 
that  included the following four elements: (i)  colonies can import only products from the metropolis and 
tariff rates must be low, normally zero percent, (ii) colonial exports can be made to the metropolis only 
from which they could be reexported, (iii) production of manufactured goods that can compete with the 
products of the metropolis is banned, and (iv) transport between colony and metropolis is conducted only 
on metropolis’ ships. 
 
17
 Other authors (like Utsa Patnaik, 2005, and Samir Amin, 1970) argue that exploitation was indeed 
instrumental in launching the Industrial revolution. According to Patnaik’s calculations, net transfers from 
India financed more than 2/3 of British gross capital formation in  the early 19th century. He puts it thus: 
“This [transfers] helps to answer the question which has vexed economic historians of Britain for decades 
and to which they have hitherto not found an analytical answer: how did Industrial revolution take place in 
a country undergoing wartime financial strains, [and] where there was no observed doubling of the 
investment rate from domestic savings…as development theory from Lewis to Kuznets and Rostow, said 
there should be”.  
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we take 1800 as that  arbitrary cut-off date. But this, in addition to France and England, 
leaves a number of other metropoles potentially responsible for the damages done: Spain, 
Ottoman Empire, Russian Empire, Japan, Portugal, United States, Holland, Belgium, 
Italy. Many of them are seldom mentioned as possible culprits perhaps because of a 
somewhat Eurocentric slant of the literature on colonial compensation. Moreover, it is not 
quite clear whether today’s Russia and Turkey are legal successors to the two empires 
whose core states they were and if the “bills” should be sent to them. Second, if one 
believes that at the global level, ethically meaningful relations are between individuals 
only (as cosmopolitan view—see below—would have it), that is, by individuals 
unmediated by their societies or “peoples”, 18 it is then difficult to see why the present 
population of the North would have to compensate the present population of the South for 
things neither of them, taken as individuals, are responsible.19 Of course, one could 
counter-argue that present inhabitants of the North enjoy higher capital stock (and higher 
income) precisely because of past exploitation. But that leads us into a very uncertain 
territory where individuals are sanctioned simply because they belong to a given 
collectivity and this very fact is in direct opposition to cosmopolitanism. We move to the 
cosmopolitan  view next.  
  
4. Global application of the difference principle? 
 
Grounds for global redistribution, according to the cosmopolitan view, are the same ones 
as grounds for national redistribution.20  Individuals in the world operate (make a social 
contract) under a similar veil of ignorance as they do in Rawls’ nationally circumscribed 
contract (Beitz, 2000; Pogge 1994; a very explicitly in Beitz 1999, p.176). Now, for this 
to be true, the density of materially consequential relationships between individuals who 
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 “The monist idea is that the basic constituency for all morality must be individuals not societies or 
peoples.” (Nagel, 2005, p. 124).  
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 A very similar point is made by Janos Kis (quoted by Nagel, 2005, p. 129, footnote 13).  
 
20
 A nice definition is offered by Beitz (2000, p. 688): “…the cosmopolitan view…accords no moral 
privilege to domestic societies. At the deepest level, cosmopolitan liberalism regards the social world as 
composed of persons, not collectivities like societies or peoples, and insists that principles for the relations 
of societies should be based on a consideration of the fundamental interests of persons”.   
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live within the same national borders and between individuals across borders, must be 
similar. Indeed, if countries were fully autarkic with social cooperation limited to the 
members of each individual society, there would be no grounds for cross-country or 
global transfers (see Beitz 1990, p. 140, or Julius 2006). But if the world is inter-
connected, even if the density of these connections is higher within individual nations or 
between groups of nations, decisions undertaken by a person A in one country can be 
shown to have consequences on “life plans” of a person B in another country. Under 
these conditions, considerations of global justice kick in.  They derive from inter-
connectedness or inter-dependency between individuals rather than from individuals’ 
partaking in the same sovereign authority. 21 A seemingly slight, but I think important, 
modification to that rule is Beitz’s (1990) insistence that global justice considerations 
begin once (i) interrelatedness reaches a certain threshold, and (ii) there are global 
(international) nonvoluntary institutions. This version places greater emphasis on the 
existence of institutional factors and not only density of economic links. One could 
consider the first kind of requirement for the introduction of global justice consideration 
economic only, the second (Beitz) a modified economic cum institutional, and the third 
(Nagel) to be purely political.22  If the first or second requirements are validated, then the 
same rules for justice must hold at the global as at national levels. The existing level of 
global income inequality does not seem to be the one compatible with the highest 
possible income for the poor. On the contrary, inequality might be reasonably thought too 
high. There are then strong grounds for the application of the global difference principle. 
 
                                                 
21
 Nagel (2005) view that a global sovereign authority, a global contract, is needed before the obligations of 
global justice kick in. In other words, only “political conception of justice” (being in associative 
relationship with other peopple) matter. That political conception could, one day, cover the entire globe. 
But that day has not arrived yet.  
 
22
 The problem with a purely economic view may be as follows. Density of economically consequential  
relations is obviously greater among the rich countries and consequently the obligations of cross-border 
justice should then apply with greater force to them and among them. This leads to a paradoxical 
conclusion that the difference principle may have to be applied on a club-like basis (among the rich 
countries only). The institutional view seems to anticipate this problem and allows for the fact that a given 
institutional structure  (say, World Bank, IMF, WTO etc) exerts a particularly strong effect on poor 
countries. Hence the justice relations must be global, that is include all countries and people even if density 
of relationship between some countries (say, Mauritania and the rest of the world) is negligible. 
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This is of course not admitted by Rawls who explicitly  rejects the application of 
the difference principle to any level above that of  “people” (or more accurately, as 
explained in the Annex, of  that of “nation-state”).23 Wenar (2006) and Nagel (2005) 
provide very well argued explanation of Rawls’s view. According to Wenar (2006), it is 
based on the claim that legitimacy  (being perceived by own population and other 
governments as legitimate) is the building block in any pact between nations (or 
“peoples”, in Rawls’ terminology). Relations between nations are fundamentally different 
from the relations between individuals and their governments. While the latter relations 
are motivated by some kind of social contract, the former (state to state) rest on the 
entirely different basis, that of mutual recognition of legitimacy. Since this is a pact made 
between peoples, and not between individuals, no global difference principle can exist.24 
According to Nagel (2005. p. 121), absence of moral duties, except those of charity, 
toward other peoples is derived from the fact that “justice is something we owe 
through…shared  institutions only to those with whom we stand in a strong political 
relation”. This is the anti-monist or political theory of justice. It does not take the 
attainment of global justice as strictly speaking impossible; yet it can come only when 
there are global sovereignty and global contractual bonds between individuals. This does 
not appear imminent. But even if  global government were possible, Rawls,  following 
Kant, believes that it would come at the cost of unbearable despotism which would 
eventually dissolve in anarchy. Thus, in practical terms, the political theory of justice 
does stop at the level of  a nation-state or people. 25  
                                                 
23
 “…if a global principle of distributive justice for the law of  peoples is meant to apply to our world as it 
is with its extreme injustices, crippling poverty, and inequalities, its appeal is understandable. But if it is 
meant to apply continuously without end—without a target, as one might say—in the hypothetical world 
arrived at after the duty of assistance is fully satisfied, its appeal is questionable. In the latter hypothetical 
world, a global principle gives what we would…regard as unacceptable results. (Rawls, 1999, p.117). 
Cosmopolitanism is rejected on the following grounds (Rawls, 1999, p. 60): “No people will be willing to 
count the losses to itself as outweighed by gains to other peoples; and therefore the principle of utility, and 
other moral principles…are not even candidates for a Law of Peoples”.  
 
24
 Underlying legitimacy is a diversity of doctrines which exist in the world which means that the bases of 
own legitimacy (legitimacy of various governments) will differ. It is then difficult to see how a single 
global institution necessarily built on the basis of one doctrine could be acceptable to all individuals (see 
Wenar, 2006,  p. 13).  
 
25
 This is based on Kant’s statement in “Perpetual Peace” written in 1795 (see Kant, 1963, p. 113). But in 
his “Idea for a Universal History”, written in 1784, Kant says something very different (Kant, 1963., p. 23): 
“The impact of any revolution on all states on our continent, so closely knit together through commerce, 
 16 
 
There is, I think, also another possible explanation for Rawls’s refusal to broaden 
the sphere of applicability of the difference principle. It may be found in his view of 
society as composed of “non-comparing” groups.  In a discussion of “Envy and Equality” 
(chapter 81 in Theory of Justice), Rawls makes the following statement to show that the 
application of the difference principle (within a nation) will not lead to overly large 
inequalities: 
 
Although in theory the difference principle permits indefinitely large 
inequalities in return to small gains to the less favored, the spread of 
income and wealth should not be excessive in practice, given the requisite 
background institutions. Moreover the plurality of associations in a well-
ordered society, each with its secure internal life, tends to reduce the 
visibility, or at least the painful visibility, of variations in men’s prospects. 
For we tend to compare our circumstances with others in the same or in a 
similar group as ourselves, or in positions we regard as relevant to our 
aspirations. The various associations in society tend to divide it into so 
many noncomparing groups, the discrepancies between these divisions not 
attracting the kind of attention that unsettles the lives if those less well 
placed. And this ignoring of differences in wealth and circumstance is 
made easier by the fact that when citizens do meet one another, the 
principles of equal justice are acknowledged (pp. 536-7; my emphasis). 
 
Now, compare this statement with the following one in The Law of Peoples: 
“A… reason for narrowing the gap between the rich and poor within a 
domestic society is that such a gap often leads to some citizens being 
stigmatized and treated as inferior, and that is unjust….The same would be 
true of the basic structure of the Society of Peoples should citizens in one 
country feel inferior to the citizens of another because of its greater riches, 
provided these feelings are justified (emphasis in the original). Yet when 
the duty of assistance [to the burdened peoples] is fulfilled, and each 
people has its own liberal or decent government, these feelings are 
unjustified. For then each people adjusts the significance and importance 
of the wealth of its own society for itself. (p. 114) 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
will be so obvious that the other states, driven by their own danger but without any legal basis, will offer 
themselves as arbiters, and thus they will prepare the way for a distant international government for which 
there is no precedent in world history…This gives hope finally that after many reformative revolutions, a 
universal cosmopolitan condition…will come into being as the womb wherein all the original capacities of 
the human race can develop” (my emphasis).  
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These two statements are very similar. They both view society (in one case, 
national; in another, international) as composed of broadly non-comparing groups as far 
as material riches are concerned. So the feelings of comparison, competition and envy 
between these groups will be regarded as unjustified by Rawls—once the background 
conditions of equal justice (be it among individuals of a people, or between peoples) are 
satisfied. In that sense, the decision not to allow for the application of the difference 
principle globally has its antecedent in Rawls’s view of  the  domestic society as 
composed of (to some extent) non-comparing groups. It is simply that the gap between 
different peoples is only larger than that between non-comparing groups within a single 
people, and that gap being larger, the application of the global difference principle 
becomes undesirable. 
 
Finally, note also that since the application of the difference principle is argued by 
Rawls (1971, p. 105) to give a meaningful interpretation to the principle of fraternity—
somewhat of a poor cousin compared to the principles of liberty and equality—its non-
application to the global stage implies that the feeling of fraternity must be confined to 
the members of the same people.  
 
Since there is no global government, there is also no global social contract, and no 
“addressee” to whom claims for global transfers could be made. In effect, the argument 
countering the application of the global difference principle draws a lot of its strength and 
plausibility from the fact that there are indeed no global governance institutions, in the 
same way that the argument in favor of within-national redistribution gains its strength 
from the very fact that national governments and national institutions do exist. But it 
could be that this position, perhaps in an effort to gain plausibility, sets the bar too high. 
It regards the absence of global governance institutions as a “proof” that they cannot exist 
and that the level of shared destiny and affinity between all individuals in the world can 
never approach that existing between individuals belonging to the same people. But 
perhaps we are asking too much, a world government no less, rather than taking a more 
evolutionary approach to the  building of global institutions. The latter approach  I  call 
“creping cosmopolitanism”.  
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5. Creeping cosmopolitanism 
 
It is very unlikely that global institutions could be built at once, that both nation 
states and world individuals would suddenly express (feel) the need for some kind of 
global governance. The bonds of affinity and joint history are clearly not (yet) 
sufficiently strong. However such institutions can be built from bottom-up, or more 
exactly in parts.  Rather than aiming for, or waiting for, an illusory world government, 
one could start by arguing that the most pressing global issues (including global poverty 
and global environment) must be tacked at the global level and that adequate institutions 
for these limited tasks ought to be created first. The issue-centered creation of global 
governance institutions may be likened to the creation of individual “government  
departments” enabled to handle global issues without a prior construction of  a global 
government. In other words, by creating particular global bodies that deal with issues 
circumscribed in scope yet global in the sense that they affect many individuals in the 
world irrespective of their citizenship, we would be gradually introducing elements of  
global governance. 
 
Several schemes of what may be called “creeping cosmopolitanism” have been 
proposed as tools for redistribution of income at the global scale. Thomas Pogge (1994) 
proposed a Global Resource Tax based on the view that depletable resources are a global 
endowment and that there should be  a global tax paid by those who exploit them. That 
global tax would then be used to finance transfers to the poor people (in poor countries). 
Although Pogge does not define the institutions that would do the transfers as global but 
rather simply as a technical expedient that would “facilitate” the transfer, there is, I think, 
little doubt that his scheme would imply  some “creeping cosmopolitanism” . Pogge  
(1994, p. 224) admits as much by stating that it would lead to “a great role for central 
organizations, and in this sense, more world government than we have at present”. 
Borocz (2005) looked at the economic feasibility of a redistribution that would reduce the 
current standard deviation of mean country incomes by one-half. Richest countries like 
Luxembourg and Switzerland would contribute the largest part of their income, and the 
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biggest beneficiaries would be the poorest nations. Borocz (2005, p. 891) is aware that 
such a scheme would require “the construction of social institutions leading to political 
action on the part of the sane and responsible majority of humankind” but he is agnostic 
about the type of institution that would accomplish this. Milanovic (2006) proposes that 
the proceeds of a global tax on some income-elastic goods or services (like air travel or 
financial transaction) or on activities that generate negative externalities (like CO2 
emissions or depletion of natural resources) be handled by a Global Welfare Agency 
(GWA). GWA would distribute the proceeds to poor people without any intermediary 
role of their governments. GWA would be an explicitly global body since it would have 
both some taxation power, thus diluting the sovereignty of wealthy states, and full 
disbursement power to poor individuals, thus dispensing with the approval from poor 
countries’ government and thereby diluting their sovereignty as well. Reddy (2006), in 
the discussion of contingent (or “state-of-the-world-dependent”) repayment of 
international debt needs to solve the problem of how a given unfavorable “state of the 
world”, which  gives rise to either full or partial debt cancellation, is to be defined. Here 
again, a global agency might be in charge of issuing such guidelines. 26  
 
6. Toward limited globalism 
  
 There is no doubt that nation states remain the key actors in today’s world. 
Many non-personal relations between individuals in the world are conducted  solely 
through the intermediation of their respective national governments. On the other hand, 
gingerly and with many ups and down,  global organizations do emerge. They already 
cover areas such as environment, human rights, corruption, public health, governance 
even economic development. They are global because their emergence has not been 
mandated by any inter-governmental agreements. The reason why these global bodies are 
present today while they did not exist 20 or 30 years ago is because the nature of the  
problem has changed. Many of the issues with which global bodies deal today are 
perceived to affect most of the world regardless of where people live and whose citizens 
                                                 
26
 Although Reddy considers the IMF as a possible adjudicator.  
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they are. This is at its clearest with environmental issues such as pollution and global 
warming. But others, such as human rights or various pandemics, have joined the list. 
More recently, terrorism may be added to it. 27 
 
 To illustrate the change that has happened, recall that these issues were off-
limits in the past either because nation states insisted on strict non-interference in 
domestic affairs, or, when the issues were brought forward, this was often in the context 
of ideological jostling between capitalist and socialist camps during the Cold War. The 
very first effective formulation of human rights as a global issue took place within the so-
called “third basket” of the Helsinki process on European cooperation and security.28 
While the first basket—then considered crucial—the inviolability of borders in Europe 
has long collapsed, the third basket, extracted by the West as a concession from the 
Soviets for having to accept the first basket—had immediately taken off the life of its 
own. It has led to a sprouting of national non-governmental Helsinki Watch committees,  
and later to a global human rights watch body. When we look at the history of other 
global bodies, it is not much different. Transparency International was, in some 
rudimentary form, started by a few individuals in the World Bank. They left the World 
Bank, incorporated themselves and started a global organization that currently has 
sections in more than 100 countries. Other examples include Medecins sans frontières or 
more recently Reporters  sans frontières. One must keep in mind however that these 
global organizations or associations will, as they become more common, represent 
different parts of global society. While at first they seem to have been dominated by the 
activists’ zeal and to have espoused “progressive” causes, there is no reason why this 
should remain so. People with different interests and different views of the world will 
(and do) organize similar global associations. International Crisis Group or Trilateral 
Commission which include many powerful people from (what may be called) global 
establishment—and which have often been criticized to be furthering particular 
“regressive” interests—may be seen as such examples. They key point is that we do not 
                                                 
27
 I am adding terrorism reluctantly to that list because of a manifestly biased hysteria spread on that 
account. Yet there is no doubt that some global aspects are indeed present.  
 
28
 Obviously, the Universal declaration of human rights existed since 1948 but its political relevance, 
despite many signatory governments, was minimal.  
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distinguish these organizations by the agenda they pursue but by whether they are 
founded by global citizens or by inter-state agreements. 
 
 It should be obvious that what I have in mind here is different from what 
Nagel (2005, p.142) views—and later rejects in favor of a more conventional position—
as  “a possible position covering the case that is intermediate  between the political and 
the cosmopolitan conceptions [of justice]” with collective responsibility following some 
kind of a sliding scale from being strong among members of the same people to weaker 
among people connected through international trade to a very weak between people in 
general, otherwise not clearly connected in any sense. The reason why this  
“intermediate” position,  similar to the networks identified by Slaughter (2004), is 
different from “creeping globalism” is that the “intermediate position” is still a product of 
inter-state relations and contracts. For example, both the Basel committee on banking 
supervision (used by Slaughter as an example of “new” networks) and the IMF are inter-
state associations. While they do create some relationship between individuals belonging 
to different countries, these  relationships are both (i) weak and (ii) subject to state 
approval. The second point is crucial, the first incidental. These agreements do influence 
lives of individuals but only to the extent that the states which are signatory are willing to 
allow it. Such institutions cannot, I believe, be precursors of truly global institutions 
precisely because the state is still a key actor. This, of course, becomes very clear if a 
state refuses to participate in such an association or agreement as, for example, shown by 
the US or Russia’s decision not to sign the Kyoto Protocol. Global independent 
associations of individuals might, at first, play a lesser role in the life of people in 
different parts of the world than the inter-state organizations but they have one big 
advantage: state fiat is not needed for their existence and functioning. 
 
 The truly global, and state-independent, organizations are more likely to 
develop from voluntary associations of individuals or non-governmental organizations 
spanning, at first, several and gradually more countries. What is crucial in these global 
organizations is (i) that they were not started by inter-governmental agreements, (ii) that 
they have members or chapters in practically all countries in the world, and most 
 22 
importantly, (iii) that they have become major “players” in their areas, influencing both 
governments and international organizations. In that way, creeping globalization of 
international governance is indeed happening. One might hope that, similarly, creeping 
globalization will soon come to include bodies that would be able, independently, to help 
the poorest citizens of the world by having the claim on some, small, portion of  the 
income of the globally rich. 
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ANNEX 
Absence of federalism in Rawls. 
An odd feature of Rawls’ Law of Peoples is absence of the discussion of 
federalism. This is all the more surprising since the book is suffused with theory and 
examples drawn from US history, and federalism is indeed one of  the core contributions 
made by the American political thought.   
 
However, when one reflects better, one can see why federalism was such an 
awkward thing for Rawls to handle. Suppose (realistically) a multi-ethnic (multi-people) 
federation like Spain, Great Britain, Nigeria or Indonesia.29 30 Then, the question is 
raised. If the difference principle applies only to “peoples”, how are different peoples that 
compose a multi-ethnic federation to arrange their own relations? The answer, from 
Rawls’s own theory, should be that they must arrange it the same way that such relations 
are arranged between different peoples. In other words, they would deal with each other 
as one people with another, including the fact that the difference principle would not 
apply. But this is patently absurd since such a loose federation where members would 
deal with each other as if they were foreign countries could not long exist. It would surely 
dissolve.  
 
But if then multi-ethic federations have to behave the same as single-people 
countries or nation-states (including observing the difference principle between different 
individuals even if they belong to different peoples), it then clearly follows that the 
application of the difference principle at the global level is not meaningless or 
                                                 
29
 The critique is adumbrated and then dismissed by Beitz (2000, p. 680). He questions whether “the 
requisite common sympathies…can be found in culturally diverse societies like those of the United States 
Belgium…India or the Philippines”. He dismisses this critique however by saying that Rawls may argue 
that he does not claim that many states do satisfy the criterion for being a people but rather that it would be 
desirable to move in direction of nation states. This does not seem fully justified: federations of ethnically 
diverse people are neither an anomaly nor are they in the danger of extinction. It is odd not to offer any rule 
as to how they should function. 
 
30
 Rawls does not require that people be necessary ethnically the same; it is sufficient that they have the 
same social values (p. 24). But this is exactly the problem: Islamic and Christian Nigerians may not (and 
probably do not) share the same values.  
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impossible. This is because the application of that principle at the global level is no 
different from the application of the same principle in a multi-ethnic federation (the issue 
being one of scale not of principle).31 
 
We thus  see why Rawls had to drop consideration of multi-ethnic federations 
from his book, and why his rules can apply (even taking his own approach) only to a 
world composed of nation-states only. But such a world is clearly very different from the 
world as it currently exist (and as it existed) since many peoples do not have their own 
nation state (whether they are divided between several countries as the Kurds are, or 
share one country –say as Ibos do in Nigeria—with a number of other peoples). For these 
countries, there are within the confines of Rawls’s  theory only two possibilities: (i) either 
they are ignored, or (ii) his difference principle can, in principle, apply –despite his  
argument to the contrary, to the entire world. 
                                                 
31
 Furthermore, it cannot be said, as a matter of general principle, that the cultural or ethnic differences 
between peoples composing a multi-ethnic federation are less than the differences between each of them 
and a randomly chosen other far-away peoples. On the contrary, often times, the differences between the 
proximate people, of which a federation is composed, are subjectively greater. Thus, both the Sunni and the 
Shia may perceive the gap between them to be greater than the gap between each of them and the Japanese.  
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